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Social difficulties in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) may originate from a reduced top-down 
modulation of sensory information that prevents the spontaneous attribution of intentions to 
observed behaviour. However, although autistic people are able to explicitly reason about others’ 
mental states, the effect of abstract intention information on perceptual processes has remained 
untested. ASD participants (n = 23) and a neurotypical (NT) control group (n = 23) observed a hand 
either reaching for an object or withdrawing from it. Prior to action onset, the participant either 
instructed the actor to “Take it” or “Leave it”, or heard the actor state “I’ll take it” or “I’ll leave it”, 
which provided an explicit intention that was equally likely to be congruent or incongruent with the 
subsequent action. The hand disappeared before completion of the action and participants reported 
the last seen position of the tip of the index finger by touching the screen. NT participants exhibited 
a predictive bias in response to action direction (reaches perceived nearer the object, withdrawals 
perceived farther away), and in response to prior knowledge of the actor’s intentions (nearer the 
object after “Take it”, farther away after “Leave it”). However, ASD participants exhibited a 
predictive perceptual bias only in response to the explicit intentions, but not in response to the motion 
of the action itself. Perception in ASD is not immune from top-down modulation. However, the 
information must be explicitly presented independently from the stimulus itself, and not inferred 
from cues inherent in the stimulus. 
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Difficulties in social communication and 
interaction, alongside restricted and 
repetitive behaviours and interests, form a 
core symptom cluster of autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD), affecting the initiation and 
reciprocation of non-verbal, emotional, and 
communicative interactions (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). There is an 
emerging consensus that these social 
difficulties may originate, in part, from a 
general overreliance on bottom-up sensory 
input, at the expense of top-down 
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information (e.g., Palmer, Seth, & Hohwy, 
2015; Van de Cruys, et al., 2014). Reduced 
top-down influence would particularly 
affect social interactions, as the hidden 
goals and intentions that drive others’ 
observed behaviour need to be constantly 
disambiguated (e.g. Bach, Nicholson, & 
Hudson, 2014; Barresi & Moore, 1996; 
Hohwy & Palmer, 2014). In typically 
developing individuals, such top-down 
influences allow others’ behavior to be seen 
not as simply the movement of the limbs, 
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but in terms of the mental states that cause 
it, as if others’ intentions, beliefs, and 
emotions were “drawn” onto the behaviour 
(for reviews, see Bach & Schenke, 2017; 
Gallagher, 2008; Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 
2010). This direct perception of the goals 
and intentions that imbue observed 
behavior with meaning may be less evident 
in ASD, so that behaviour is perceived only 
in terms of what is explicitly visually 
available. 
So far, research has however 
primarily tested situations in which the 
relevant high-level information was merely 
implied by the observed behaviours, and not 
explicitly given, and therefore needed to be 
spontaneously inferred from the action 
kinematics. This limitation is crucial 
because there is emerging evidence that 
while autistic people can reason about 
others’ mental states when explicitly asked, 
they tend to not do so spontaneously (e.g., 
Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Frith & Frith, 
2008; Schaller & Rauh, 2017; Senju, 2010; 
Tager-Flusberg, 2001; Zalla, Labruyere, 
Clement, & Georgieff, 2010). Despite 
being able to differentiate actions based on 
explicitly available visual information, for 
example recognizing different actions or 
discriminating them from robotic or 
scrambled motion (e.g., Cusack, Williams, 
& Neri, 2015), autistic people find it 
particularly difficult when action 
perception requires spontaneous inferences 
of higher-level information, such as the 
goals implied by an action (Ganglmayer, 
Schuwerk, Sodian & Paulus, 2019; Hudson, 
Burnett, & Jellema, 2012), an actor’s false 
beliefs (Schuwerk, Jarvers, Vuori, & 
Sodian, 2016; Senju et al., 2010), the 
emotions implied by biological motion 
(Centelles, Assaiante, Etchegoyhen, 
Bouvard, & Schmitz, 2013), or the intention 
behind communicative gestures (Von der 
Luhe et al., 2016). 
To convincingly test whether ASD 
involves a generalized reduction in top-
down processing, it needs to be established 
that these characteristics persist even if the 
relevant higher-level information is 
explicitly given, in a form that makes 
spontaneous inferences unnecessary. This 
study provides this crucial test. It utilizes a 
recent paradigm (Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, 
& Bach, 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, 
Simpson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016) that reliably 
reveals how social perception in 
neurotypical individuals is biased by the 
integration of both explicit top-down 
intention information, and intention 
information merely implied by the actor’s 
behaviour. In each trial, participants view, 
on a monitor, an actor’s hand near an object 
and are given explicit information about the 
actor’s goal, either by hearing the actors 
verbal statements (e.g., “I’ll take it!”, “I’ll 
leave it!”), or by themselves instructing the 
actor (“Take it!”, “Leave it!”). They then 
briefly view the actor either reach for or 
withdraw from the object, equally likely 
following the expectation or acting against 
it. The hand disappears mid-trajectory, and 
participants simply report, either on a touch 
screen, or using a probe comparison task, 
the last seen position of the hand. Across 
several studies, these perceptual judgments 
were reliably distorted by the goal implied 
by the action kinematics, so that a reach was 
perceived nearer the object than it really 
was and a withdrawal further away (the 
representational momentum effect: Freyd 
& Finke, 1984). Importantly, perceptual 
judgments were also biased by the actor’s 
explicit intention statements. Participants 
reported hands further towards an object if 
the intention was to “take” the object and 
further away if to “leave” it. Crucially, the 
effect increased the more reliably the 
intention predicted the action (Hudson, 
Bach & Nicholson, 2018), consistent with 
an optimal integration of prediction 
information into one’s perceptual estimates 
(Ernst & Banks, 2002). 
These studies show that, in 
neurotypical participants, action perception 
is enriched by top-down goal expectations 
derived from both explicit intention 
information and action kinematics (Bach et 
al., 2014; Hudson, McDonough, Edwards, 
& Bach, 2018; McDonough, Costantini, 
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Hudson, & Bach, 2020; McDonough, 
Hudson, & Bach, 2019). Here, we used this 
task with autistic individuals, and a 
matched group of neurotypical individuals, 
who completed both the spoken instruction 
and heard intention variants of the 
experiment. This study directly tests 
whether action observation in ASD is 
generally immune to top-down information, 
or whether it is evident if the goals are 
provided explicitly through the intention 
statements. Moreover, comparing the 
spoken and heard version of the task will 
reveal whether those with ASD generally 
over-weigh self- compared to other-
generated predictors, as some proposals 




Neurotypical participants (n=28) 
were recruited from Plymouth University 
and wider community. ASD participants 
(n=28) were recruited from local 
community services in the region via 
intermediaries within and outside of 
Plymouth University. All participants had 
normal/corrected vision and gave written 
informed consent. All ASD participants had 
received a clinical diagnosis of Autism 
Spectrum Disorder, meeting either DSM-
IV/V (APA, 1994; 2013) or ICD-10 (WHO, 
1993) criteria. Sample size was constrained 
by participant availability but matched 
previous studies. After exclusions (see 
Results), our sample size of 23 in each 
group provides 80% power (G*Power: Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to 
detect across-groups within-subject effects 
sizes of .42, within-groups effect sizes 
of .61, and between-subject effect sizes of 
0.84. The smallest effect sizes of interest 
detectable with this paradigm (SESOI, 
Lakens, Scheel, & Isager, 2018) are .30, .43 
and .59, respectively.  The experiment was 
approved by Plymouth University ethics 
board.  
Participants completed the Autistic 
Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 
2001), which is a 50-item self-administered 
questionnaire that measures the degree of 
autistic traits in clinical and neurotypical 
populations along five dimensions (social 
skills, attention switching, imagination, 
attention to detail, and communication). 
Initial feedback from potential participants 
and their support worker suggested that the 
four response options (definitely/slightly 
agree, definitely/slightly disagree) be 
condensed to two (agree, disagree). The 
binary scoring of 1 or 0 for each item of the 
AQ permitted this with no loss of variance 
in AQ scores. Participants also completed 
the Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning 
subtests (FSIQ-2) of the WASI IQ test 
(Wechsler, 1999), although we were unable 
to collect data from two NT participants. 
After participant exclusions (see below), 
the two groups did not differ in age, gender, 
Full-2 IQ, Verbal t-score or Perception t-
score, whilst AQ scores were higher for the 
ASD group (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Participant information after exclusions. Sample size and gender composition, with 
mean and SD of age, WASI score, and Autistic Spectrum Quotient Score for each group. 
 
 N (females) Age Left Handed IQ Verbal Perception AQ 
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Apparatus & Stimuli 
The experiment was administered 
using Presentation (NeuroBS) on a Hewlett 
Packard s230tm EliteDisplay Touchscreen 
(1920x1080, 60 Hz). A Logitech PC120 
combined microphone and earphone 
headset delivered auditory stimuli and 
registered verbal responses. 
The stimulus set consisted of 8 
action sequences, each consisting of 26 
frames (960 X 540 px). They were filmed 
with a Canon Legria HFS200 at 30fps and 
separated into individual frames with 
MovieDek. Each sequence showed a hand 
reaching from the right to the left towards a 
goal object, depicting the initial start of the 
action but stopping before object contact. 
Sequences were digitally manipulated 
using Corel Paintshop Pro X6, so that all 
background details were replaced with a 
uniform black background. Four sequences 
showed natural reaches towards objects that 
were safe to touch (water bottle, water glass, 
wineglass, handle of a knife). In the other 
four sequences, the safe objects were 
digitally replaced by a painful object of 
similar size (cactus, broken water glass, 
broken wineglass, knife blade), ensuring 
identical reach kinematics in both 
conditions.  
Each sequence started with the hand 
at a neutral middle point (randomly chosen 
between frames 11-16) and progressed 
forwards or backwards through the 
sequence in two-frame steps for 3, 4, or 5 
frames (80ms each) to depict reaches for or 
withdrawals from the object. The response 
stimuli were created by erasing the hand 
from a single frame of each of the 
sequences to depict just the object. When 
displayed directly after the action, it created 
the impression that the hand simply 
disappeared. 
Audio stimuli of an actor saying “I’ll 
take it” and “I’ll leave it” (1000ms duration) 
were recorded with a M-Audio Microtrack 
2 Digital Voice Recorder, and were 
presented binaurally but biased 50% to the 




Participants first completed two 
training sessions, which served to 
progressively familiarise them with the task 
requirements (see Supplementary Materials 
for analysis). In the first training session (42 
trials), participants reported, via 
touchscreen, the position of a briefly 
presented static hand. In the second training 
session (48 trials), participants judged the 
final position of a moving hand after it had 
disappeared. As in the main experiment, 
participants were instructed to touch the tip 
of the index finger.  
 Participants then completed two 
blocks of the experiment. Each trial (Figure 
1) started with a written instruction to hold 
the spacebar with the right hand, to prevent 
Figure 1. Trial sequence in the experimental blocks.
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tracking of the stimulus with the finger, 
while the other hand rested on the desk or 
lap. A fixation cross was then presented for 
500 to 1000ms, followed by the first frame 
of the stimulus sequence (hand in neutral 
position). In separate blocks, participants 
either verbally instructed the actor (Spoken 
Instruction) or heard the actor state an 
intention (Heard Intention). In the Spoken 
Instruction block, participants said “Take 
it!” if the object was safe to grasp and 
“Leave it!” if the object was potentially 
painful. Responses were not recorded but 
correct performance was monitored 
throughout by the experimenter. In the 
Heard Intention block, participants heard 
the actor say “I’ll take it” if the object was 
safe, and “I’ll leave it” if the object was 
potentially painful. Block order was 
counterbalanced between participants. In 
both blocks, there was a 50% congruency 
between intention statement and action, and 
participants were explicitly told that the 
actor was just as likely to do what they had 
said/were instructed as do the opposite. The 
biases we measure therefore reflect 
people’s prior expectation that other’s 
statements truthfully signal their intention, 
rather than contingencies learned within the 
experiment. 
In both conditions, the action 
sequence began 1200 ms after the onset of 
the intention statement or the registration of 
the verbal response by Presentation’s sound 
threshold logic, showing the hand reaching 
for or withdrawing from the object, for 3, 4 
or 5 frames. When the hand disappeared 
mid-action, participants released the 
spacebar and, with the same hand, touched 
the screen where the last seen position of 
the tip of the index finger had been. For 
each experimental session, participants 
completed 10 practice trials, followed by 
two blocks of 48 trials, providing all 
factorial combinations of object type (safe, 
painful), object identity (4), action direction 
(reach, withdrawal), and sequence length (3, 
4, 5 frames).  
 
 
Trial and participant exclusion 
Trials were excluded if the correct 
response procedure was not followed 
(participants released the spacebar prior to 
offset of the visual stimulus) and if the 
response initiation time (spacebar release 
after stimulus offset) or response execution 
time (spacebar release to touch screen 
response) was less than 200 ms or more 
than 3SD above the group mean. Trial 
exclusions for the NT group (9%, SD = 
6.5%) and ASD group (14%, SD = 15%) 
did not differ (t(44) = 1.61, p = .116), 
leaving on average 174 trials per participant 
in the NT group (22 per condition) and 163 
trials per participant in the ASD group (20 
per condition). After exclusions, response 
initiations were slower to intention/action 
incongruent than congruent actions (F(1,44) 
= 7.52, p = .009, ηp2 = .146), and the ASD 
group was slower than the NT group to 
initiate responses (F(1,44) = 5.05, p = .03, 
ηp 2=. 103) and execute responses (F(1,44) 
= 19.6, p < .001, ηp 2= .308), but this group 
effect did not interact with any of the 
conditions of interest (see Supplementary 
Materials). Participants were excluded (NT 
= 4; ASD = 3) if their responses showed no 
consistent relationship with the visual 
stimuli, as assessed by four a priori criteria 
(Hudson, Bach, et al., 2018): (1) if the 
selected screen position in each trial was 
not significantly correlated with the real 
screen position on either axis; (2) if the 
correlation coefficient between the real and 
selected screen positions was less than 3SD 
below the group median on either axis; (3) 
if the mean screen distance (pixels) 
between the real and selected screen 
positions was more than 3SD above the 
group mean; (4) if not enough valid trials (< 
50%) remained after trial exclusions (see 
below). One additional NT participant was 
excluded because they misunderstood the 
task, and two ASD participants were 
excluded for terminating the experiment 




Predictive Action Perception in Autism 




To assess the prediction that location 
judgments would be shifted in the direction 
of the actors’ explicit goal (nearer the object 
after “take”, farther after “leave”) and in the 
direction of the action trajectory (nearer for 
reaches, farther for withdrawals), we 
measured the difference between the hands’ 
location and where participants localized it 
on the touch screen. For each trial, the 
perceptual bias in pixels was calculated by 
subtracting the real disappearance point of 
the tip of the index finger from the 
participant’s touch screen responses. 
Positive values reflect rightward (X axis) 
and upward (Y axis) biases from the real 
position, and negative values reflect 
leftward (X axis) and downward (Y axis) 
biases. 
As in prior work (Hudson, Bach, et 
al., 2018; Hudson, McDonough, et al., 2018; 
McDonough et al., 2019), participants 
generally pressed further rightwards (34.0 
px) and downwards (-105.3 px) of the real 
stimulus position, reflecting well-known 
shifts towards a stimulus’ centre of gravity 
(Coren & Hoenig, 1972). The overall 
distance from the real position did not differ 
between groups (t(44) = 1.51, p = .140), but 
the ASD participants had a larger 
rightwards bias (ASD: 41.2 px; NT: 26.9 px, 
t = 2.28, p = .027), but a smaller downwards 
bias (ASD: -96.1 px, t = 2.57, p = .014; NT: 
-114.5 px). As these biases reflect general 
localization errors that are independent 
from our effects of interest, and are also 
present in the training sessions with 
dynamic and static stimuli (see 
Supplementary Material), the mean biases 
across groups were subtracted from each 
participant’s mean response, therefore 
leaving all comparisons of interest 
unaffected. 
 These difference scores were 
analyzed separately for the X axis and Y 
axis with a mixed-effects ANOVA, with 
Intention Type (heard intention, spoken 
instruction), Action (reach, withdrawal), 
and Intention (take it, leave it) as within-
subject factors, and Group (NT, ASD) as 
between-subjects factor. Main effects of 
Action will reveal the extent to which 
responses are biased away from the hands’ 
real position towards the goals implied by 
the action kinematics (further leftwards 
towards the object for reaches than for 
withdrawals). Main effects of Intention will 
reveal the extent to which responses are 
biased away from the hands’ real position 
towards the explicitly provided goal 
information (further leftwards for goals to 
“take” the object rather than “leave” it)
1 . Interactions with Group will reveal 
whether ASD and NT groups differ in how 
much perceptual judgments are biased by 
kinematics (Action X Group) and explicit 
goal information (Intention X Group).  
There were no between-group 
differences in variance on any of the effects 
                                                            
1 The main effect of intention is statistically equivalent to the congruency effect in which perceptual biases are 
larger for matching kinematics and prior intentions compared to mismatching ones. The difference between 
“Take” and “Leave” are free to differ (+/-) from zero independently of the action effect. The greater the 
difference between the intention conditions, the more maximal the perceptual shift leftwards is for reaches after 
“Take it” and the more maximal the perceptual shift rightwards is for withdrawals after “Leave it”, relative to 
incongruent conditions (reaches after “Leave it”, withdrawals after “Take it”). The intention effect can be 
reconceptualised as a non-directional shift (e.g., by sign reversing responses in the reach condition), so that they 
reflect perceptual shifts along the trajectory, irrespective of which direction that is. From that perspective, the 
disappearance point of reaches would generally be shifted forwards in the direction of motion, but less so when 
the intention was to “leave” rather than to “take” the object. Conversely, the disappearance point of withdrawals 
would be shifted forwards in the direction of motion, but less so when the intention was to “take” rather than to 
“leave” the object. Both analyses are statistically identical: they only differ in the sign with which deviations for 
reaches are coded (see also Hudson, Bach, et al., 2018). 
of interest (Levene’s max F = 3.69, p 
= .061). Bayes factors are reported for 
crucial two-sided tests with default priors 
using JASP (JASP Team, 2018), which 
provides a relative estimate of how much 
more likely the presence of an effect is 
given H1 than the null hypothesis. All other 
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main effects or interactions will be 
evaluated against a Bonferroni-corrected 
alpha threshold for incidental findings due 





As predicted, and replicating our 
prior work, there was a main effect of 
Action, F(1,44) = 6.27, p = .016, ηp2 = .13, 
95% CI [2.2, 23.7], BF10 = 2.18, showing 
that perceived disappearance points of 
reaches were shifted more leftward 
(towards the object) than those of 
withdrawals, and a main effect of Intention, 
F(1,44) = 53.4, p < .001, ηp2 = .548, 95% 
CI [6.9, 12.4], BF10 = 2.763e+6 (Figure 2), 
showing that perceptual judgements are 
biased more leftward after an explicit 
intention to “Take” the object than to 
“Leave” it, showing the predicted 
perceptual bias towards explicit action 
goals.. 
The main question was whether the 
perceptual biases induced by explicit 
intention information was smaller in the 
ASD group, as predicted from a generally 
reduced reliance of top-down information. 
However, there was strong evidence against 
an interaction of Intention and Group, 
F(1,44) = 1.78, p = .190, ηp2 = .04, 95% CI 
[-8.9, 1.8], BF10 = 0.60. Separate analyses 
provided decisive evidence that intentions 
to “take” or “leave” the object biased 
perceptual judgments towards and away 
from this object in both groups, with similar 
effect sizes in the ASD, t(22) = 4.97, p 
< .001, d = 1.03, 95% CI [6.7, 16.2], BF10 
= 451.7, and the NT group, t(22) = 6.05, p 
< .001, d = 1.26, 95% CI [5.2, 10.6], BF10 
= 4809. Thus, explicit goal information 
biases social perception in both groups, 
refuting a generalized impairment in top-
down processing. 
Regarding motion prediction cues, 
the analysis revealed an interaction of 
Action and Group, F(1,44) = 4.30, p = .044, 
ηp2 = .09, 95% CI [0.6, 42.3], BF10 = 1.61. 
Analysis of the NT group provided strong 
evidence that seeing reaches and 
withdrawals biased perceptual judgements 
towards or away from objects, t(22) = 4.43, 
p < .001, d = .92, 95% CI [12.6, 34.7], BF10 
= 141.5. However, for the ASD group, this 
analysis provided considerable evidence 
against such a bias, t(22) = .25, p = .804, d 
= .05, 95% CI [-20.6, 16.1], BF10 = 0.23. 
Thus, while perceptual judgments are 
biased by explicit intention information in 
ASD just as in NT participants, they are 
unaffected by goals implied by the action 
kinematics. 
Finally, the analysis revealed the 
predicted interaction of Intention Type 
(spoken, heard) and Intention (take it, leave 
it), F(1,44) = 17.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .28, 95% 
CI [3.1, 8.9], BF10 = 171.8, showing that 
spoken intentions induced larger perceptual 
shifts than heard intentions, but this did not 
differ by Group, F(1,44) = 1.2, p = .277, ηp2 
= .03, 95% CI [-2.7, 9.0], BF10 = 0.48. As 
we had no further predictions, all other 
effects are subject to alpha inflation in an 
ANOVA (Cramer et al., 2016, Bonferroni-
adjusted p < .003). No further main effects 




As we had no predictions for the Y-
Axis, a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha of p 
< .003 was employed (Cramer et al., 2016). 
A main effect of Action, F(1,44) = 139.6, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .76, 95% CI [31.8, 44.9], BF10 
= 2.597e+12, showed that reaches were 
perceived higher than withdrawals, 
consistent with a bias in motion direction 
(i.e. upwards for reaches, downwards for 
withdrawals). There also was a main effect 
of Intention, F(1,44) = 28.6, p < .001, ηp2 
= .394, 95% CI [2.1, 4.5], BF10 = 7116. 
Hand disappearance points were perceived 
higher if the intention was to “Take” than to 
“Leave”. There were no interactions 
between Intention and Group, F(1,44) = .05, 
p = .825, ηp2 = .001, 95% CI [-2.2, 2.8], 
BF10 = 0.30, or between Action and Group, 
F(1,44) = 1.4, p = .243, ηp2 = .03, 95% CI [-
5.4, 20.8], BF10 = 0.51. 
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Figure 2. The perceptual bias (selected screen position – real screen position) on the X and Y 
axis for the NT (top row) and ASD (bottom row) groups, depending on whether explicit 
intentions were passively heard (left panels) or actively spoken (right panels). The intersection 
of the crosshairs at 0,0 represents the real disappearance point on any given trial, corrected for 
overall (across-group) biases in finger placement, with the object located to the left. In each 
panel, bias in the direction of the observed kinematics (main effect of Action) is reflected in 
how much perceived disappearance points of reaches (squares) are shifted leftwards compared 
to those of withdrawals (circles). The bias in the direction of prior intentions (main effect of 
Intention) is reflected in how much explicit intentions to “take” the object (filled markers) shifts 
perceived disappearance points leftwards compared to intentions to “leave” the object (empty 
markers). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.   
 
Relative weighting of motion and goal 
information 
We next sought to establish whether 
the predictors of explicit intention and 
action kinematic information exert an equal 
influence on perceptual judgments, or 
whether one is weighted more than the 
other, and how this may differ between 
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groups. For each participant, we derived 
statistically orthogonal indices of the effect 
of each predictor type by comparing the 
main effect of Action (withdrawals – 
reaches) and the main effect of Intention 
(Leave It – Take It). A mixed-effects 
ANOVA was conducted with Group (NT, 
ASD) as a between-subjects factor, and 
Intention Type (heard, spoken) and 
Predictor Type (motion, intention) as 
within-subjects factors (Figure 3A). The 
analysis revealed an interaction between 
Predictor and Group, F(1,44) = 4.71, p 
= .035, ηp2 = .097, 95% CI [1.8, 48.2], BF10 
= 1.88. The NT group showed a larger 
influence of motion (m = 23.7px, SD = 25.6) 
than intention information (m = 7.9px, SD 
= 6.2, t(22) = 2.97, p = .007, d = 0.75, 95% 
CI [4.7, 26.8], BF10 = 6.52). In contrast, the 
ASD group showed no bias, t(22) =.902, p 
= .377, d = 0.34, 95% CI [-30.4, 11.9], 
BF10 = .315, although numerically there 
was a larger influence of intention 
information (m = 11.4px, SD = 11.0) than 
motion information (m = 2.2px, SD = 42.5).  
There was a three-way interaction of 
Intention Type, Predictor, and Group, 
F(1,44) = 6.12, p = .017, ηp2 = .122, 95% CI 
[5.7, 55.2], BF10 = 3.22. When analysed 
separately, the NT group provided 
considerable evidence for the absence of an 
interaction of Intention Type and Predictor, 
F(1,22) = .78, p = .387, ηp2 = .034, 95% CI 
[-12.7, 5.1], BF10 = 0.311. Perceptual 
judgments were weighted more in favour of 
motion information than intention 
information in both the Spoken and Heard 
conditions. This interaction was, however, 
present in the ASD group, F(1,22) = 5.34, p 
= .031, ηp2 = .95, 95% CI [2.7, 50.5], BF10 
= 1.96, who, unlike the NT group, weighted 
intention information more strongly than 
motion information in the Spoken condition 
but not the Heard condition. 
 
Exploratory correlational analyses 
We assessed the relationship 
between the weighting of motion and 
intention information across participants 
(Figure 3B). The NT group showed no 
correlation in the perceptual shift caused by 
motion and intention information, r = .136, 
n = 23, p = .536, 95% CI [-.314, .585], BF10 
= 0.31. However, in the ASD group, those 
participants who afforded less weight to 
motion information gave more weight to 
intention information, r = -.503, n = 23, p 
= .014, 95% CI [-.895, -.111], BF10 = 4.33. 
Finally, we tested whether the relative 
influence of motion and intention 
information was associated with individual 
differences in IQ or autistic traits, as 
measured by the AQ and its subscales. For 
each participant, the perceptual shift 
elicited by intention information was 
subtracted from that elicited by motion 
kinematics, indexing the size to which each 
participant weighted each predictive source. 
The NT group exhibited no relationship 
between this relative weighting and overall 
AQ score, nor any of its subscales, or the 
verbal or perception WASI sub-tests. The 
ASD group exhibited no relationship 
between autistic-like traits and the 
preference of motion or intention 
information except for a marginal (against  
Bonferroni-corrected p = .008) negative 
association with the social skills sub-scale, 
r = -.538, p = .008, 95% CI [-.155, -.920], 
BF10 = 7.0. The greater the deficit in social 
skills, the larger the influence of explicit 
intention information on the intention-
action prediction effect. Moreover, there 
were significant relationships between the 
extent of motion information weighting and  
performance on the verbal, r = .489, p 
= .018, 95% CI [.094, .885], BF10 = 3.64, 
and perceptual subtests, r = .523, p = .010, 
95% CI [.137, .910], BF10 = 5.70, 
indicating that the higher the IQ score, 
irrespective of domain, the greater the 
influence of motion information compared 
to intention information. 95% CI 
[.137, .910], BF10 = 5.70, indicating that 
the higher the IQ score, irrespective of 
domain, the greater the influence of motion 
information compared to intention 
information.
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Figure 3. Panel A: The relative weighting of Motion information and Intention information on 
the perceptual shift for NT (left) and ASD (right) groups. Error bars represent standard error 
of the mean. Panel B: The relationship between the weighting of Motion and Intention 
information for each participant in the NT (left) and ASD (right) groups.  
 
Discussion 
Here, we tested whether social perception 
in autism spectrum conditions is 
impervious to top-down expectation (e.g., 
Palmer et al., 2015; Van de Cruys, et al., 
2014). Replicating our prior work (Hudson, 
Bach, et al., 2018; Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, 
et al., 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, 
et al., 2016), in NT participants, perceptual 
judgments of others’ actions were 
predictively biased by both the goals 
implied by the observed kinematics (a reach 
or withdrawal) and by the explicit 
intentions (to “take” or “leave” the object). 
The ASD participants differed markedly 
from this pattern, but in a manner 
inconsistent with a generally weaker top-
down influence. The explicit intention 
statements to “take” or “leave” the object 
biased perceptual judgments as in NT 
participants, revealing that top-down 
influence of higher-level goal information 
onto action perception is fundamentally 
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intact. However, ASD participants 
exhibited no perceptual shift in response to 
the goals implied by the observed 
movements. Thus, top-down expectations 
about another’s goals shape social 
perception in ASD just as they do in NT 
individuals, but only if these expectations 
are explicitly provided and do not have to 
be spontaneously inferred from the 
observed kinematics itself. 
These findings challenge the 
growing consensus that social perception in 
ASD is not influenced by top-down 
modulation (e.g., Palmer et al., 2015; Van 
de Cruys, et al., 2014). Instead, our findings 
imply a more differentiated account in 
which prediction channels for perceptually 
derived top-down information are down-
weighted in ASD, while others remain 
intact, perhaps guided by the relative 
reliability of prediction sources (Ernst & 
Banks, 2002). Indeed, our analysis of the 
relative weighting of both types of intention 
cues found that neurotypical participants 
weighted prior motion information more 
strongly than intention information, as 
expected given that current motion is the 
more reliable predictor of future position. In 
contrast, for the ASD group, explicit 
intention information exerted a greater 
influence on the top-down predictive bias 
than action kinematics, specifically when 
these intentions were given to the actors by 
the participants (rather than passively 
heard). In addition, in ASD participants, but 
not in the NT group, the weighting of both 
predictors was negatively associated, with 
the influence of intention information 
increasing the more that of kinematic 
information decreased. This suggests a 
difficulty integrating the two sources of 
information, which is resolved by down-
weighting kinematic relative to explicit 
intention information (Ernst & Banks, 2002; 
Hudson, Bach, et al., 2018; Zaki, 2013), 
although these results should be interpreted 
with caution due to the low sample sizes.  
The question then is why autistic 
people would form predictions only when 
the predictive cue is made explicit. This 
may speak to the hierarchical organization 
of the social perception system. Higher-
level predictions generalize across space 
and time and become translated into action 
expectations further down the hierarchy, 
possibly via goal-to-kinematic 
transformations in the motor system (Kilner, 
2011), about what one will perceive, such 
as the assumption that others will behave in 
the most efficient way possible to achieve 
their goals (Marsh, Pearson, Ropar, & 
Hamilton, 2015). Action expectations can, 
however, also form locally, within the 
perceptual system for analyzing biological 
motion (Scholl & Gao, 2013; Hudson, 
McDonough, et al., 2018; McDonough et 
al., 2019). Our data suggest that it is in these 
low-level prediction processes that the 
differences in social perception may 
originate (Palmer, Lawson, & Hohwy, 
2017). This could reflect either the use of 
kinematics to generate perceptual 
predictions about an action’s future course, 
or the perception of a coherent motion 
percept from the sequential motion frames, 
which requires predictive processes 
(Kourtzi & Shiffrar, 1999; Yantis & 
Nakama, 1998), but which is compromised 
in ASD (David et al., 2010).  
These findings of reduced reliance 
on motion prediction maps nicely onto 
wider issues in biological motion 
perception in ASD, whereby small 
reductions in biological motion sensitivity 
may give rise to up-stream difficulties in the 
interpretation of social information from 
motion cues, such as emotion (for meta-
analyses see, Federici, Parma, Vicovaro, 
Radassao, Casartelli, & Ronconi, 2020; 
Todorova, McBean Hatton, & Pollick, 
2019). Interestingly, motion perception 
sensitivity is related to the extent of the 
autistic condition (Kaiser & Shiffrar, 2009) 
and we similarly found that the 
underweighting of motion relative to 
intention information was negatively 
associated with IQ and social skills. While 
these findings need to be confirmed in more 
complex and realistic behaviors, they 
suggest that the shift from spontaneous 
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inferences to explicit information could 
become more pronounced with a more 
heterogeneous sample that encompasses all 
levels of the autistic spectrum. Moreover, 
perceptual processes may be employed for 
prediction if provided with explicit 
information about the reliability of such 
sensory information (e.g., Hudson, Bach, et 
al., 2018). 
The current findings have 
implications beyond the domain of social 
perception. Atypical social perception 
overlaps with that of non-social perception, 
reflecting a broader difference in 
integrating top-down input, resulting in 
both perceptual enhancements and 
impairments (Behrmann, Thomas, & 
Humphreys, 2006; Mottron, Dawson, 
Soulieres, Hubert, & Burack, 2006). An 
increased reliance on bottom-up sensory 
evidence at the expense of top-down 
information can explain many 
characteristics of perceptual anomalies in 
ASD, such as the preference for local 
details over global configuration (Happé & 
Frith, 2006), higher motion coherence 
thresholds (Milne, Swettenham, Hansen, 
Campbell, Jeffries, & Plaisted, 2002; Zaidel, 
Goin-Kochel, & Angelaki, 2015) or the 
reduced use of complex/second order 
motion cues (Bertone, Mottron, Jelenic, & 
Faubert, 2003; Kaiser & Shiffrar, 2009). 
We suggest that these findings may not 
reflect a general reduction in the use of 
high-level information to shape sensory 
input, but instead the spontaneous 
generation of the relevant inferences from 
the input.  
 
Conclusion 
Social perception in ASD is subject 
to top-down modulation but only if this 
information is explicitly given as abstract 
information that is independent of the 
stimulus itself. Such perceptual processes 
in the social domain may represent an 
especially notable example of a more 
general atypicality in ASD perception. This 
study opens up a new avenue for perceptual 
research in ASD. Perceptual processes in 
ASD may in fact be open to top-down 
influences if such information is explicitly 
provided.  
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